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Abstract  
The need for uniformity in international maritime law has been long recognised. Each 
international treaty is drafted and ratified with the intention of drawing the legal rules 
governing the carriage of goods by sea closer together. This is not always the end result, 
however, with varying decisions and a plethora of interpretations creating a system of rules 
and judgements that are as dynamic as the area of law itself. From determining when a certain 
treaty wil apply, to when a carrier wil be able to rely on a specific defence, the outcome is 
not always clear and can change with a simple decision of which legal jurisdiction to issue 
proceedings in. The efect this has on the protection of carriers can be substantial; 
circumstances where a carrier may have been able to rely on a certain defence in one 
jurisdiction may not be suficient in another. This article wil analyse the current rules and 
determine whether carriers have suficient protection, whether there is suficient uniformity 
in the law governing carriage of goods by sea and what can be done to increase uniformity. 
The idea of whether an international court of tribunal being created in an attempt to unify 
and standardise interpretations of the Hague-Visby Rules wil also be discussed. Multimodal 
transport is also an issue; with the presence of treaties governing the individual legs of the 
journey as wel as treaties purporting to govern the whole carriage. As to which treaty is the 
correct one, uncertainty prevails. 
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Maritime law is governed internationaly by a series of treaties. One such treaty is the Hague-
Visby Rules which lay down a set of fundamental rules that govern the duties of a carrier and 
their liabilities should they breach one of those duties. It is because of this that the Hague-
Visby Rules are, perhaps, the main instrument through which international maritime law is 
governed from the perspective of the carrier. The Hague-Visby Rules apply compulsorily in 
English Law to carriage of goods by sea under a bil of lading or other document of title.1 On 
the face of it, international maritime law (the lex maritima) should, on a basic structural level, 
be predisposed to self-standardisation; by its very nature, it is a vast network of 
interconnectivity. Such networks of interconnectivity have often created network-efect-
induced standards, and when the law codifies these pre-existing standards, clarity in the 
market results.2 Indeed, a standardised body of transnational maritime law has developed 
through network-related efects but such standardised law can either be an obstacle or an 
aid in preventing maritime law become fragmented and polycentric.3 
It is clear that the aim of the Hague-Visby Rules is to ‘modernise and harmonise the rules that 
govern the international carriage of goods involving a sea leg, enhance legal certainty, 
improve eficiency and commercial predictability in international trade and reduce legal 
obstacles to international trade among al States’.4 It has been argued that the Rules have had 
limited success in this aim, and the writer hopes that the issues which wil be raised 
throughout this article wil show that significant questions stil remain regarding the 
interpretation of the Rules. This article wil now seek to discuss and analyse the issues around 
the uniformity of the lex maritima generaly as wel as reaching a conclusion as to whether 
there can be uniformity in the interpretation and application of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Before one considers the issues that are presented in multimodal transport containing a sea 
leg, one must consider the issues regarding the interpretation internationaly of key aspects 
of the Hague-Visby Rules. Take, for instance, the issue of when the Hague-Visby Rules wil 
apply; the Rules apply in English Law to contracts of carriage that are covered by a bil of lading 
or similar document of title.5 CoGSA also provides that the Rules wil apply to any receipt that 
 
1 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (CoGSA 1971). 
2 Bryan Druzin, ‘Towards a Theory of Spontaneous Legal Standardisation’ (2017) JIDS 8(3) 403-431. 
3 Ibid. 
4 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/122 (2 February 2009) Preamble 4. 
5 CoGSA 1971. 




is a non-negotiable document if the contract contained in it or evidenced by it is a contract 
for the carriage of goods by sea and it expressly or impliedly provides that the Rules shal 
govern that contract as if the receipt were a bil of lading.6 
Indeed, it therefore appears that the Rules only apply compulsorily if a bil of lading or similar 
document of title have been issued. In common law countries, however, it is generaly 
accepted this would be an extremely narow reading of the Rules.7 What appears to matter 
is that the shipper had the right to have a bil of lading issued; if he later choses, for whatever 
reason, to not demand a bil of lading, this is irelevant.8 The case of Kyokuyo appears to take 
the generaly accepted principles further – not only did the shipper not insist on a bil of lading, 
he accepted a sea waybil instead.9 Clearly a sea waybil is not a bil of lading, or even a similar 
document of title. Nevertheless, Baker J, held the Rules did compulsorily apply since the 
contract of carriage provided for the issue of a bil of lading – he went further to state that 
there was no valid reason to distinguish between a shipper who does not exercise their right 
to a bil of lading and a shipper who accepts another document in lieu of a bil of lading.10 
Whilst this decision may appear to contrast starkly with Article I (b), given further analysis it 
may be perfectly sound. If the Rules apply as soon as the contract of carriage provides for a 
bil of lading, even if the right to demand is not actualy exercised, then the way in which the 
right is not exercised should not matter at al.11 To go further, the construction of Art.I in 
Kyokuyo has the added benefit of increasing uniformity; the Rules are unique in the family of 
carriage conventions in that their applicability depends on a specific document type. For 
example, whilst other treaties and conventions stil require a transport document, the 
absence of such a document does not prevent the convention from applying.12 Therefore, in 
applying the Rules to sea waybils issued in lieu of a bil of lading or similar document of title, 
the Rules move a step closer to the other carriage conventions.13 
 
6 CoGSA 1971 s.1 (6)(b). 
7 Frank Stevens, ‘Scope and Application of the Hague-Visby Rules’ (2017) JIML 23 6, 392. 
8 Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia Navigation Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 402; Parsons Corp v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy 
Ranger (The Happy Ranger) [2002] EWCA Civ 694 [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 357. 
9 Kyokuyo Co Ltd v A P Moler Maersk [2017] EWHC 654 (Comm) [2017] 2 Al ER (Comm) 922. 
10 Ibid at 48. 
11 See, n.7 Stevens. 
12 See, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (1999); Uniform Rules 
concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail (1980). 
13 See, n.7 Stevens. 




Across international boundaries, the issue becomes complicated. In the Netherlands, it is 
generaly accepted that the Rules apply if the contract of carriage envisaged the issue of a bil 
of lading, even if no bil was issued.14 Whilst the case of a sea waybil issued instead of a bil 
of lading has not yet arisen in Dutch courts, the Rotterdam Court ruled that sea waybils are 
not considered a bil of lading or similar document of title and the Rules do not apply to 
carriage under solely sea waybils.15 
The issue is complicated even more in France, owing to the fact that the authentic French 
translation of the Rules is not identical to the English translation. The French version refers to 
‘al similar documents that are a title for the carriage of goods by sea’. The French text 
therefore refers to similar transport documents, and it has been explicitly argued that sea 
waybils are ‘similar transport documents’ and thus governed by the Rules. Furthermore, the 
French position states that the Rules apply even where no bil of lading has been issued.16 
Quite, as the French text is not entirely consistent with the English text, this does raise distinct 
issues if judges in England begin to consider the jurisprudence of French judges in attempting 
to increase the uniformity of the interpretation of the Rules.17 
Internationaly, Belgium occupies a unique position when addressing this question. It has 
been suggested academicaly that the intention to issue a bil of lading, even if no bil is 
actualy issued, is suficient to make the Rules applicable.18 Nonetheless, the Belgian Supreme 
Court controversialy held that that where there was only an intention to issue a bil of lading 
and no bil was issued or where a sea waybil was issued instead, the Rules do not apply, in 
clear contrast to the English position.19 The position generaly appears to folow thus: the 
shipper and carrier are entitled to agree that no bil of lading wil be issued and that the 
shipper wil not be entitled to demand one and as such the Rules wil not apply. The parties 
can further circumvent the mandatory nature of the rules by deciding to use a diferent 
transport document.20 Nevertheless, it may be arguable that the only recourse open to the 
 
14 J Teunissen, Tekst & Commentaar Burgerlijk Wetboek (10th edn, Kluwer 2013) 4845. 
15 Rb. Rotterdam, 14-09-2016, no. C / 10/477731 / HA ZA 15-646 (14th September 2016) 
16 P Bonassies and C Scapel, Droit Maritime (2nd edn, LGDJ 2010) 613. 
17 Måns Jacobsson, ‘To what extent do international treaties result in the uniformity of maritime law?’ (2016) 22 
JIML 2, 94. 
18 C Smeesters and G Winkelmolen, Droit Maritime et Droit Fluvial, vol I (2nd edn, Larcier 1933) 363. 
19 Cass (11 September 1970) Arr Cass (1971) 33. 
20 See, n.7 Stevens.  




parties would be to issue an alternative transport document as a variation of the original 
contract, or as a waiver or estoppel of the shipper’s rights to demand a bil of lading.21 Whilst 
this has only previously been raised in passing, further clarification may be given on this issue 
in future.22 This would not be without issue however; Article II(8) of the Rules provides that 
any clause that relives the carrier of liability wil be nul and void. Varying the contract in such 
a way where the Rules no longer apply may wel mean a reduction of liability, and thus such 
a variation would be nul and void. It therefore appears that the only absolute way in which 
the parties can exclude the application of the Rules would be to provide explicitly from the 
beginning that a bil of lading wil not be issued, and the shipper wil not be entitled to demand 
one.23 Given the disparity of international interpretation of Article I(b), the lex maritima is 
fertile soil for legal standardisation. Subsequently, the adoption in English Law of the 
approach taken in France, i.e. to definitively include alternative transport documents, would 
aid the protection of carriers if their liability would be lessened by the application of the 
Rules.24 However, it is arguable that it would be an unwanted and unhelpful result, if by virtue 
of the Rules applying to contracts of carriage under a sea waybil, the carrier was exposed to 
a higher level of liability.25 
Looking specificaly at the provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules, an area of international 
contention appears to be Article IV Rule 2. Indeed, there are divergent translations of the 
relevant Hague-Visby provisions, giving rise to the dificulties of domestic judicial 
interpretations across signatory states.26 Judges are, after al, human beings and wil naturaly 
revert to the strong influence of the legal traditions prevailing in their respective countries.27 
It has been argued that there are similarities as wel as diferences in the way the provisions 
of the Hague-Visby Rules are interpreted and therefore if uniformity exists then the intention 
of the drafters of the Rules wil be honoured.28 It has been further argued that multinational 
 
21 Frank Stevens, ‘The Scope of Application of the Hague-Visby Rules and ‘Units’ for Limitation Purposes’ (2018) 
24 JIML 3, 178. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See, n.17 Jacobsson. 
24 See, n.2 Druzin. 
25 See, n.21 Stevens. 
26 See, n.17 Jacobsson. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Comité Maritime International 'The travaux préparatoires of the Hague and of the Hague-Visby Rules'27 
(available online <https://comitemaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Travaux-Preparatoires-of-the-
Hague-Rules-and-of-the-Hague-Visby-Rules.pdf> Accessed 16 February 2019). 




conventions do result in uniformity across domestic law as conventions aim at preventing the 
law being regulated in a contradictory way.29 This section wil now analyse the respective 
circumstances of Article IV Rule 2 and their interpretation across international boundaries 
and evaluate whether there is adequate uniformity in the interpretations and, if there is scope 
for uniformity, which approach wil be most beneficial for the protection of carriers. 
Article IV, Rule 2 (c) provides carriers with a defence against liability for damage or loss arising 
from ‘perils, dangers and accidents of the sea’. Under English Law, a peril of the sea includes 
events particular to the sea or a ship at sea, such as: accidental incursion of sea water; 
currents; storms; colisions; tides and stranding.30 However, incidents which may occur ‘on 
the sea’ but which are not particular to a ship at sea (rats damaging cargo, damage owing to 
explosions of boilers or torrential rainfal) wil not qualify as a peril of the sea.31 Whilst it has 
been argued that exoneration under this provision must result from exceptional violence of 
the wind and waves, it has been frequently found that unexceptional force can constitute a 
peril of the sea.32 The inconsistencies are not only present across international boundaries, 
but within English Law itself; for example, force 10 waves in the Atlantic Ocean during autumn 
may not be a peril of the sea – however, force 10-12 waves in the same Ocean during winter 
may constitute a peril.33 Summarily, perils of the sea under English Law are occurrences 
particular to the sea or to a ship at sea; and although they do not need to be extraordinary in 
nature, they do need to be reasonably unavoidable and unforeseeable occurrences.  
Under French law, périls de la mer (perils of the sea) are events emanating from the sea, for 
example: storms, fog, tides, stranding and colisions.34 The position in France is markedly 
similar to that of England. French cases often refer to perils of the sea as events of exceptional 
force or intensity, or as unusualy harsh occurrences (anormalement pénible).35 In France, 
winds of force 10-12 and waves of 6-8 metres (vagues monstrueuses) have been classed as 
perils of the sea.36 Again, similar to English courts, where the event in question is not 
 
29 Rodolfo Sacco ‘Diversity and uniformity in the law’ (2001) 49 AJCL 171. 
30 The Xantho (1887) 12 App Cas (HL); Canada Rice Mils v. Union Marine (1941) AC 55. 
31 The Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hamilton, Fraser & Co. (1887) 12 App.Cas. 484 
32 The Stranna [1938] P 69. 
33 The Tilia Gorthon [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 552; WP Wood & Co. v. Hanseatische (1930) 37 Lloyd’s LR 144 (KB) 
34 The Amorique (Cour d’Appel de Paris) (1971) 23 (1971) DMF 222. 
35 The Normania (Tribunal de Commerce de Paris) (1973) 26 (1074) DMF 161; The Koudekerk (Cour d’Appel d’Aix) 
(1973) 25 (1972) DMF 654. 
36 The Cap Canaile (Tribunal de Commerce de Marseile) (2004) 2005 DMF 894. 




necessarily extraordinary in nature, it may be considered to be a peril of the sea.37 Diferences 
begin to manifest in the French assimilation of perils of the sea into the domestic concept of 
force majeure (cas fortuit ou de force majeure). Under French law, it is usualy extreme 
weather conditions that qualify as a peril/force majeure; and owing to this rigid approach, a 
view has developed that perils need to be an irresistible but foreseeable event.38 This 
assimilation traditionaly rejects the idea that a carrier may be exonerated from liability in the 
presence of situations which a reasonable carrier may have prevented.39 Notwithstanding the 
decisions in favour of the carrier, French courts do not readily exonerate the carrier on the 
basis of perils of the sea.40 Quite, this rigour is said to reflect the restrictive nature of the 
French force majeure notion.41 
In comparison, Greek law also identifies examples of perils of the sea as: incursion of sea 
water into the vessel, rough seas, storms, large waves and colisions.42 Furthermore, Greek 
law adopts a paralel position to English law insomuch that events occurring on the sea but 
not attributable to the sea’s characteristics (rainwater or defective machinery damaging 
cargo) do not qualify as a peril of the sea.43 It has been wel established in Greece that perils 
of the sea are unavoidable events.44 Two distinctly divergent schools of judicial thought have 
evolved in Greece; the older school tends to assimilate perils of the sea into the domestic 
concept of superior force and the more recent school goes in the opposite direction. The 
‘superior force’ school requires an event, either internal or external to the carrier’s control, 
which is reasonably unforeseeable.45 The more recent school states that perils of the sea have 
a broader scope than the domestic superior force concept and that perils can be foreseeable; 
they simply need to manifest themselves under unusualy intense and dangerous 
conditions.46 
 
37 The Tolga (Cour de Cassation) (1991) 44 (1992) DMF 627. 
38 R Rodière, E du Pontavice, Droit Maritime (12th edn, Éditions Daloz 1997) 348. 
39 Cap Bon (Cour de Cassation) (1973) 1073 DMF 399. 
40 The Ras Mohamed (Cour de’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence) (2001) 2001 DMF 820. 
41 C Scapel, Droit Maritime (2nd edn, LGDJ 2010). 
42 Court of Appeal of Piraeus 373/1997 (182353). 
43 A Kiantou-Pampouki, Nautiko Dikaio I (6th edn, Sakkoula 2007) 542. 
44 Court of Appeal of Piraeus 603/1988 (61220). 
45 Supreme Court 438/2013 (607127) and see, n.101 Kiantou-Pampouki. 
46 Court of Appeal of Piraeus 289/2005 (382874). 




In the three jurisdictions considered above, it is clear that what wil constitute a peril of the 
sea wil be determined on a case-by-case basis; taking into account factors like the conditions 
of the sea and winds, location and time of the year. This leaves considerable discretion for 
judges and this unarguably leaves great uncertainty for a carrier as to the circumstances when 
they wil be able to rely on this defence.47 A striking diference between English law on the 
one hand and French and Greek law on the other, is the fact that English law requires that a 
peril of the sea cannot be foreseen or guarded against by the exercise of reasonable care. The 
traditional judicial stance in France and Greece is to assimilate perils of the sea into domestic 
concepts like force majeure. Greek law favours a subjective force majeure approach, referring 
to unavoidable perils by measures of utmost diligence and care; while French law favours an 
objective approach and applies a reasonableness standard. The difering approaches do not 
provide the needed certainty for carriers and this uncertainty does not correspond to the 
intended outcome of the Rules. Thus, it cannot be said carriers have adequate protection as 
a case which may revolve around the height of a wave or strength of the wind may have 
substantialy diferent outcomes for a carier depending which jurisdiction the case is heard 
in.48 
Therefore, attempting to accurately reach a uniform interpretation of a peril of the sea is 
plainly impossible given the tendency for judges to revert back to familiar domestic concepts 
such as force majeure.49 To go further, domestic law concepts cannot provide uniformity 
when applied at international level.50 Nevertheless, it would appear that if al signatory 
countries folowed the French and Greek interpretation of alowing foreseeable but 
unavoidable events to qualify as a peril of the sea, this would do much to create certainty and 
uniformity of international interpretation while providing the most carrier-protective 
solution.51 Article IV Rule 5 (b) provides that compensation for loss or destruction of goods is 
to be quantified by reference to their market value; unhelpfuly, European interpretations on 
this Article are inconsistent. The central issue surrounding this Article is whether it provides 
merely a vague guidance as to the assessment of damages or whether it modifies the law of 
 
47 Marel Katsivela, ‘Perils of the sea under English, French and Greek law; a perilous venture?’ (2014) 20 JIML 5, 
343. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See, n.17 Jacobsson. 
50 See, n.47 Katsivela. 
51 Ibid. 




damages in such a way as to prevent the shipper from claiming more than the value of the 
goods, even if his loss is greater. Prima facie, the answer to the question of whether Rule 5 
(b) limits recovery to the market value is clearly ‘no’.52 Indeed, authority from the USA 
suggests that damages could be available beyond the value of the goods.53 Furthermore, the 
provision reads plausibly as: first, a requirement to measure the value of the goods, where 
relevant, to reference to the market value; second, a prima facie quantification of cargo 
claims on this basis, but with adjustment in line with the facts of the case.54 
Accordingly, many jurisdictions have taken this view. For example, the French Cour de 
Cassation upheld a judgement against the carriers for the shipper’s entire loss rather than for 
the modest value of the goods.55 Norway, too, has adopted this approach; the shipper was 
awarded sizeable damages for consequential loss.56 The position in England has also 
proceeded on the basis of a lack of any such limitation, in line with the corresponding 
European decisions.57 The English courts had the opportunity to decide the question of the 
extent of Rule 5 (b) categoricaly. However, this case was decided in favour of the carrier on 
a point of general limitation, thus leaving the question of Rule 5 (b) unhelpfuly unanswered.58 
Despite this, however, there is a large amount of academic opinion supporting Rule 5 (b) being 
used as a genuine limitation; this body of support comes from both civil (Spain and Italy, 
respectively) and common law jurisdictions.59 According to the German Commercial Code, 
carrier’s liability has been limited to the value of the goods.60 To go further, this provision has 
consistently been interpreted as excluding any claim for consequential loss.61 Therefore, it is 
 
52 F Berlingieri, The Hamburg rules: a choice for the EEC? (European Institute of Maritime Law 1994) 135-139. 
53 S Girvin, Carriage of Goods by Sea (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 30.24. 
54 See, n.7 Stevens. 
55 Cour de Cassation (15 February 1994) No 93-13, 707. 
56 Nils Blakstad & Sønner, A/S v. A/S Dolsøy Norges Høyesterett (21 November 1987) (Referenced in: T Falkanger 
et al., Scandinavian Maritime Law (3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2011) 288-289. 
57 The Subro Valour [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 509; Laiterie Dupont Morin Flechard v Anangel Endeavour Compaiia 
(1989) (unreported). 
58 Serena Navigation Ltd and another v Dera Commercial Establishment (The Limnos) 
[2008] EWHC 1036 (Comm). 
59 See, F Sanz and others, Aspectos jurídicos y econcomicos del transporte: hacia un transporte mas seguro, 
sostenible y eficiente (Castelo de la Plana Publicacions de la Universitat Jaume I, D.L. 2007) 625;  S Carbone, 
Contratto di trasporto marittimo di cose (Giufre 2010) 412–14; and Francis Reynolds 'Package or unit limitation 
and the Visby Rules' [2005] LMCLQ 1. 
60 German  Commercial  Code (Handelsgesetzbuch,  1900) s.502 (<http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_hgb/englisch_hgb.pdf> Accessed 4 March 2019. 
61 German Federal Court of Justice, 25.09.1986 - I ZR 26/86. 




unsurprising that some academics have welcomed the opportunity for Rule 5 (b) to be read 
as a genuine limitation provision.62 The varying interpretation of the same Hague-Visby 
provision is undeniably perturbing, and the overwhelming impact on the protection of carriers 
cannot be said to be positive.63 However, if the approach of the German courts is adopted in 
English law, this additional cap on liability is far more advantageous to the carrier by giving 
them an extra layer of protection.64 To sum up, the justification for giving this extra layer of 
protection for cariers, which seems to have originated in Germany, provides carriers with a 
distinct privilege. As this is denied to almost everyone else, it has been argued that this is 
indefensible as a matter of interpretation, law and policy.65 On the other hand, if adopted 
absolutely in England, it wil provide carriers with a needed additional layer of protection, and 
is justified given the more equal bargaining powers of the carrier and shipper, and thus less 
of a need to protect the shipper.66 
An area which is, perhaps, ripe for uniformity is that of multimodal transport. Multimodal 
transport involves the carriage of goods utilising numerous types of transport, i.e. by road, 
then rail, then sea. Previously, when carriage of goods involved unimodal transport, the 
unimodal regime governing such modes of transport was suficient to regulate that area.67 A 
clear example of this is the Hague-Visby Rules with regard to carriage of goods by sea and the 
CIM Rules for carriage of goods by rail.68 To clarify, where cargo is carried partly by sea and 
partly by air, a bil of lading governed by the Hague-Visby Rules and an air waybil, subject to 
the Warsaw Convention69, wil be issued to cover each respective part of the journey.70 The 
adoption and implementation of several conventions dealing with sea carriage has inarguably 
made these legal regimes extremely complex.71 Moreover, it becomes necessary to establish 
 




66 Gebreyesus Yimer, ‘Adjudicatory jurisdiction in international carriage of goods be sea: would the Rotterdam 
Rules settle the controversy?’ (2013) AFJIL 467. 
67 Ramandeep Chhina, ‘Uniform international regime for multimodal transport: unarguable need but no general 
acceptance’ (2013) 19 JIML 6, 516. 
68 See, n.17 Jacobsson. 
69 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (1929) (available online 
<https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.1929/doc.html> Accessed 4 March 2019. 
70 Samir Mankabady, ‘The Multimodal Transport of Goods Convention: a chalenge to unimodal transport 
conventions’ (1983) 32 ICLQ 120, 121. 
71 Olena Bokareva, ‘Carriage of goods through multimodal transportation: in search of international and regional 
harmonisation’ (2016) 21 JIML 5, 368. 




in multimodal transport where and when the damage, loss or delay occurs to confirm which 
of the set of Rules wil apply at the point of such loss, damage or delay (e.g. if the damage 
occurs at sea then the Hague-Visby Rules wil apply; if damage occurs in the air, then the 
Warsaw Convention wil apply).72 
With the increase in technology, the particular chalenge of how to regulate multimodal 
transport arises as the use of the unimodal regimes creates significant uncertainty and 
unpredictability due to the overlapping disparate nature of their liability provisions. This 
clearly creates the need for a unified single regime governing multimodal transport.73 There 
have been previous attempts to generate a new regime, with one being The UN Convention 
on Multimodal Transport (“the 1980 Rules”).74 However it has not yet received the requisite 
number of ratifications so its likelihood of coming into force seems to be remote.75 Inarguably, 
the present law around multimodal transport is fragmented, a clear halmark of deficiency in 
smooth trade and transportation.76 
Indeed, it has been argued that creating a new regime for multimodal transport would bring 
the 1980 Rules into conflict with the existing unimodal conventions. For example, if the 
damage occurred during the sea leg of multimodal transport, then the Hague-Visby Rules may 
also apply in this situation. Mankabady argues that the strength of the 1980 Rules is their 
simplicity, but the weaknesses lie where the place of the damage is known, as it is hard to see 
why the carrier should rely on the 1980 Rules instead of the existing Conventions.77 He further 
argues, supported by Fujita, that to resolve this issue the new convention should adopt the 
‘network liability system’.78 The adoption of network rules would aleviate the conflict issue 
in practice.79 The network system of liability states that if it can be proved that the loss, 
damage or delay occurred solely during the course of one particular stage of transport, the 
operator’s liability wil be determined according to the law governing the relevant mode of 
 
72 See, n.70 Mankabady. 
73 See, n.67 Chhina. 
74 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods (1980) (available online:  
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/05/19800524%2006-13%20PM/Ch_XI_E_1.pdf> Accessed 4 March 
2019. 
75 See, n.67 Chhina. 
76 See, n.70 Mankabady. 
77 See, n.70 Mankabady. 
78 Tomotaka Fujita, ‘The comprehensive coverage of the new convention: performing parties and the unimodal 
implications’ (2009) TXLJ 349, 359. 
79 Ibid. 




transport; but if it cannot be ascertained during which leg the damage occurred, the 1980 
Rules would take precedence.80 This would do much to increase the certainty over which set 
of rules would apply. 
Indeed, as Eleni Gologina-Economou argues, in spite of the fact that the 1980 Rules establish 
a unified system of liability, which could resolve a number of issues, it cannot be ignored from 
a practical viewpoint that the 1980 Rules’ liability regime is strict, contributing to the 
opposition to them.81 Furthermore, as the 1980 Rules appear to derive their liability regime 
from the Hamburg Rules, both produce a rigid liability scheme and therefore have sufered 
the same fate in gaining widespread and vehement opposition from the shipping industry and 
specificaly from carriers.82 Indeed, under the 1980 Rules, the transport operator’s liability wil 
be limited to an amount not exceeding 920 units of account per package or other shipping 
unit or 2.75 units of account per kilogramme of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, 
whichever is higher.83 Clearly then, it is easy to see why carriers, specificaly sea carriers, 
would be opposed to this regime; this liability is substantialy more than what is contained in 
the Hague-Visby Rules.84 As such, carriers are aforded much greater protection under the 
Hague-Visby Rules than under the 1980 multimodal rules. As stated previously, there appears 
to be no logic in why the carrier would rely on the 1980 Rules when the Hague-Visby Rules 
provide a much lower liability limitation.85 
Despite the numerous advantages of the 1980 Rules, it is self-evident that, 39 years after their 
adoption, the 1980 Rules have failed to gain the requisite number of ratifications to come into 
force. This is not least due to the opposition from carriers who are unhappy with the strict 
and rigid liability regime that it contains.86 Such opposition from carriers is seemingly easy to 
justify; they are exposed to a far greater liability limit under the 1980 Rules in comparison to 
the Hague-Visby Rules. Whilst it is admirable that the international community are attempting 
to create uniformity in the field of multimodal transport, at present such uniformity is in 
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conflict with the protection carriers are aforded under the current unimodal carriage of 
goods by sea regime and unquestionably the protection of carriers must take precedence.  
In light of the slow acceptance of the 1980 Rules, a further efort was made in 1992 with the 
UNCTAD Rules (“the 1992 Rules”).87 Unlike the 1980 Rules, the 1992 Rules have garnered 
relatively considerable support from the international community; they are widely 
incorporated in multimodal transport documents, such as the FIATA Bil of Lading, a bil of 
lading widely used in multimodal transport.88 Nevertheless, an issue arises around the 1992 
Rules’ contractual nature; they do not have force of law and in order to apply they must be 
incorporated into a contract by the parties and must not conflict with the mandatory 
provisions of existing international conventions or national law.89 As such, whilst the 1992 
Rules do appear to have made some in-roads to uniformity in the governing regimes of 
multimodal transport, their restrictive application as wel as limited efectiveness do not 
appear to have made any significant legaly-binding contributions to international uniformity.  
It is clear that many dificulties are faced in creating a uniform international regime. 
Multimodal transport is an area ripe for uniformity insomuch that it is necessary to create 
certainty so the parties know they are not operating in a legal vacuum should anything go 
wrong. However, it may not be possible to resolve al of the dificulties involved given the 
amount of competing interests.90 Reiterating the disparity in the liability regimes of the 1980 
Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules, it may be necessary to create a new regime which ofers 
carriers paralel or better limitation of liability than provided at present to overcome the 
political divides hampering the introduction of a uniform international regime. Clearly, the 
past international attempts to harmonise this area have failed to achieve uniformity; not least 
due to their harsh liability regimes coming into conflict with existing unimodal conventions.91 
Summing up on these findings, many conclusions can be drawn on whether there is suficient 
uniformity in the international interpretations of the Hague-Visby Rules and whether the 
protection carriers are provided is adequate. Firstly, it can be clearly seen that the 
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international interpretations of the Hague-Visby Rules vary greatly across international legal 
jurisdictions. Pinpointing exactly why this is, however, is not an easy task in practice. It 
appears correct to say that the difering interpretation of the Hague-Visby Rules is a major 
barrier to the uniform application of the Rules as a judge in a complex shipping case may 
never before have dealt with an international statue, so he may be tempted to apply familiar 
domestic principles; judges are, after al, only human beings.92 
The efect this has on the protection of carriers can clearly be seen looking at this 
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Rules. As addressed above, the English 
courts have held that a sea waybil may constitute a similar document of title if it is issued in 
lieu of the original bil of lading. The fact that this decision is in contrast with the positions 
taken in countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, but similar to the stance in France clearly 
ilustrates a lack of uniform interpretation of the Hague-Visby Rules. Neither can a vast scope 
for judicial discretion in what wil class as a peril of the sea be said to be beneficial for the 
protection of carriers or uniformity in maritime law. It leaves gaping uncertainties. If the case 
is brought in one jurisdiction, and the carier tries to rely on the Article IV Rule 2 (c) defence, 
it may have a totaly diferent outcome than if it was brought in another jurisdiction.93 It is 
also plainly impossible for any uniformity to be reached if judges revert back to familiar 
domestic principles.94 
In regard to the Rotterdam Rules and the various multimodal transport treaties, the adoption 
of a new treaty may have an undesired efect; less uniformity in the lex maritima. Indeed, as 
has been stated, some states may ratify the new treaties and some may not, there wil be two 
treaties dealing with relatively the same issues.95 Adoption of new treaties, or indeed 
revisions of old treaties, is not the only way to increase uniformity, however. It has been 
suggested that judges who deal with cases with an international aspect, like those dealing 
with the interpretations of the Hague-Visby Rules could be given enhanced training in how to 
interpret and apply international treaties in domestic law.96 Furthermore, an active 
awareness of the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, and a wilingness to consider foreign 
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judgements, could help enormously in the unification of international maritime law.97 Despite 
the apparent ability of the lex maritima to self-standardise, a supranational court or tribunal 
may be of assistance in creating uniformity by providing a central presiding body for the 
resolution of disputes arising from the Hague-Visby Rules.98 However, this may not be a 
sensible solution in practice, especially considering the current environment surrounding 
Brexit, as a supranational body could be seen as infringing national sovereignty.99 This, 
notwithstanding, it can be argued that there is a much greater level of uniformity in maritime 
law; given the recognised need for uniformity in such an area which impacts greatly on 
international trade and the world economy.100 Finaly, conferring jurisdiction over disputes 
under these treaties to an international court or tribunal would be the only way to ensure a 
high level of uniformity; giving carriers a greater level of certainty around the likely outcome 
of a dispute.101 
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